Progress and European globalization: making our 'Belle Epoque' last edit
“At the end of that century of peace, things were improving ever more visibly, ever more rapidly. Forty years of peace had strengthened countries' economic foundations, technology had accelerated the pace of life, and scientific discoveries had filled the spirit of that generation with pride. One believed as little in the prospect of relapsing into barbarity, as is the case in wars between European peoples, as in ghosts or witches; they sincerely believed that the borders of differences between nations would little by little melt into a common humanity, and that, in this way, peace and security, the most precious of assets, would be bestowed upon all mankind.” These surprisingly modern comments were written by Stefan Zweig more than 60 years ago. They remind us that the Belle Epoque has a lot more to offer us than an idealised image of elegant women with parasols and hats.
In these trouble times, it is indeed worth taking an historical perspective. Could our period of progress and integration at both global and European level end as badly as this previous one? If so, what can we do to avoid this?
Technological and scientific progress has been at the heart Europe for centuries. Yet confidence in progress is waning. The risks inherent in chemical, biotechnological and nuclear endeavour seem sometimes to outweigh the benefits. New generations are being confronted with the worst excesses of a development which is unsustainable, by unbalanced media coverage of accidents and by attacks on the credibility of some risk assessment agencies. It is therefore essential that confidence in progress be restored, in particular by promoting the uptake of science courses and broadcasting scientifically-themed programmes in the media. More attention should be paid to support structures for risk evaluation, and especially to how these structures are run and how much independence they have.
But the Belle Epoque is also the story of the first globalisation. The world at the time had just experienced a growth as strong in 50 years as it had in the previous 1000. Economies were very integrated – sometimes more so than today – due to sizable migration and capital flow. It was an era of globalized technological breakthroughs too, with railway lines, electricity, steam ships and the telegraph: all in all, the future seemed bright. But the unregulated market was to destroy its political and social foundations, nationalism and protectionism were to gain ground, and new industrial, then geopolitical, forces were to cause defensive alliances to be forged, ultimately resulting in the outbreak of the first world conflict. Today, globalisation is anchored in a solid set of rules and multilateral institutions, such as the WTO and the IMF, and agreements such as those reached at the Rio Summit in 1992. Yet slow but profound tectonic shifts, comparable to those that preceded the end of the ‘first’ globalisation, are threatening to weaken the system. It can be safeguarded only by a policy shift that combines pragmatism, innovation and education; pragmatism, because a multilateral system needs to be successful in order to reinforce its legitimacy, in the way the G20 has done by playing a leadership role and acting as a "hub" for global issues (financial regulation, food crises, global growth); innovation, in order to explore and define the scope of future cooperation, be it internet governance, biodiversity, space policy or the Antarctic; and education, because Europe has a positive story to tell its citizens. Europe does not lack assets as far as globalisation is concerned. On the contrary: it has a dynamic and intelligent industry, and is a world leader in commercial services and investment, both of which are proving capable of resisting Chinese, American and Indian competition. If it is to maintain its competitive edge, Europe must now take advantage of global growth, which is currently taking place 90% outside of European territory.
This leads us to the question of the European project: since the Second World War, the continual progress of European construction has pushed us to look to the future. By exposing the fragility of Europe, however, the current crisis is causing old wounds to reappear: today’s rise of populism and financial uncertainty find their historical echo in the Treaty of Trianon in Hungary, the past fear of inflation in Germany, the age-old ‘isolationist temptation’ of Great Britain and the traditional French fear of 'falling behind'. Of course, treaties and institutions constitute a solid enough guarantee against the break-up of Europe – but dynamism is losing momentum. Resigned to this, some believe that a 'small, well-handled crisis' could lead to a better situation in the long term. But an explosive spark, resulting in what would be our ‘second Sarajevo’, is to be feared. It would be tragic not only for Europe, but also for global governance and regional integration initiatives in South America and Asia, who draw from the European model. What Europe needs today is not simple. It is a question of recasting the future based on a pact between citizens and Member States capable of restoring the confidence which has been eroded over the course of many years by mistakes and what has been left unsaid. It is at times like these that political vision, will and innovation come to the fore and are decisive. It is becoming increasingly clear that only a qualitative leap in the direction of a more federal Europe, built around a shared platform and shared goals, will enable us to provide new opportunities for citizens, partners and markets alike.
As in 1910's, a new civilisation has to emerge, more polycentric, more democratic and more interconnected and with a stronger Europe. To find a peaceful way through, globalisation and Europe will require continual nurturing. In the words of Stéphane Zweig, "Slowly – far too slowly, far too timidly, as we know today! – the forces opposed to war were gathering."
Eric PETERS, Advisor on European Policy to the President of the European Commission, former Deputy Head of Cabinet to Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade (2004-2009). The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the European Commission.
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