The significance of Trump's victory edit

I confess that I doubted that someone could be re-elected president of the United States who was convicted of 34 felonies, sexual violence, business fraud, and violating court-ordered rules prohibiting him threatening witnesses and judges’ families; someone who directed and celebrated a violent insurrection seeking to overturn a presidential election and who repeatedly threatened the incumbent president, as well as his opponent and countless others, in vulgar, racist language never before uttered in American public life. I also calculated that Donald Trump’s support would diminish when numerous distinguished scientists, economists, and former military and civilian officials who had served in his first administration publicly warned that he was unfit to be president and endorsed Kamala Harris. And yet by November 6th, Trump was clearly the victor.[1] On further reflection, I now recognize why the outcome that seemed inexplicable in the early hours of November 6th was probable—even overdetermined.[2]

At the same time, and furthering complicating my reflections, I differ with post-election analyses that characterize Trump’s victory as a landslide. Despite the substantial odds against a Harris victory, the election was extremely close. Nor do I agree with those who claim that she would have won if she had moved toward the political center. On the contrary, I believe that her electoral prospects would have increased if she had emulated Trump’s populist condemnation of the elite—but not by supporting his reactionary goal of turning back the clock to Make America Great Again but by attacking corporate power and greed, devoting greater government resources to addressing social problems like inadequate housing, poverty, and public health as well as redistributing more equitably the fruits of economic growth. This program might have increased her support among white working people (especially men) who have migrated to the Republican Party since the 1990s and might have prevented the erosion of Democratic support by Black and Latino voters (especially men) that occurred in 2024.

Why a democratic victory was unlikely

Before the campaign began, there were substantial obstacles to a Harris victory. First the Democratic Party had controlled the presidency for 12 of the last 16 years, the longest period of near one-party dominance since the New Deal nearly a century ago. Second, the 2024 election occurred during an anti-incumbent surge in other democratic countries, including Britain, France, Japan, South Africa, and South Korea. This tide has replaced what Francis Fukuyama identified, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the end of history.

Third, the impact of the Covid pandemic cannot be overestimated. It began when Trump was president. According to public health experts, his neglect and denial of its gravity contributed to causing several hundred thousand avoidable deaths. When Biden replaced Trump, his administration, of which vice president Harris is a key member, sponsored extraordinarily ambitious measures enabling the U.S. to become a world leader in controlling the pandemic. However, when Biden and Harris proudly proclaimed that the economy had rebounded from the medical and economic damage of the pandemic, they failed to recognize the deep emotional, psychological, and economic scars that remained. In particular, despite the steep decline in inflation, most working- and middle-class Americans, continue to suffer from the high prices generated by the pandemic. Americans rated this issue as by far the most important one facing the country. It was probably why two thirds of Americans, including most Democratic supporters, considered that the country was moving in the wrong direction.[3] While the pandemic was rarely mentioned during the campaign, it has contributed to a pervasive atmosphere of despondency. A pastor commented that “Underneath it all, so much of the rage and angst and animosity, I believe is unprocessed grief from the pandemic.”[4]

Fourth, while Biden’s economic policies helped control the pandemic and reduce the unemployment and inflation that it produced, they failed to recognize its legacy of low wages and the high cost of living.

Fifth, the structural issue underlying these substantial economic problems of the current conjuncture is the Democrats’ disinterest in addressing the fundamental importance of class inequality. Indeed, since Bill Clinton’s presidency, Democratic administrations have not only failed to deal with this structural problem but have sponsored neoliberal policies such as globalization that have increased it. Decades of economic growth since the 1990s have mostly benefited the minority of Americans with a college degree. Whereas the income of the lowest fifth of Americans has completely stagnated in the past three decades, the income of the top fifth has more than doubled. (One reason for this shift in class power is the steep decline of private sector labor unions, whose membership has dropped by two thirds since the 1970s. Ever since the New Deal, the union movement has been the major organized force defending working people, as well as a vital ally of the Democratic Party pressuring it to enact pro-labor policies.)

Another liability for a Democratic candidate in 2024 was immigration. Trump successfully scapegoated immigrants as the cause of Americans’ difficulties and blamed Biden for the surge of immigration that occurred early in his tenure. Although Biden sponsored harsh measures to reduce the flow—and immigration has declined in the last two years--the political damage persists.

These factors have provoked an angry backlash, especially among less educated white men, and has produced a massive decline in their traditional support for the Democratic Party. Trump made himself the champion of disaffected men and was the beneficiary of their votes. Until this election, analyses of this issue highlighted that it was predominantly white men who shifted their support to the GOP. However, in 2024, less educated Hispanic and Black men shifted as well.

Although the majority of black men continued to support Harris, far fewer did so compared to 2020, while Latino men shifted substantially to providing majority support for Trump.

These factors help explain Joseph Biden’s exceptional unpopularity. They would have inevitably handicapped any Democratic Party presidential candidate in 2024. But they proved especially burdensome for Biden’s vice president, who faced additional challenges stemming from the circumstances in which she became the Democratic nominee, her policy orientation, and her racial and gender identity.

The candidates and the campaign

Any Democratic Party candidate would have faced a daunting challenge in 2024. Political scientists have found that the two most reliable indicators of an incumbent party’s chance for reelection are voters’ evaluation of whether the country is going in the right direction, and whether voters judge that they are better off today than in the past. An NBC exit poll of the 10 swing states that determined the election found that 82% of voters who judged that their financial situation had improved since 2020 supported Harris, whereas nearly the same proportion of voters judging that it had worsened supported Trump. Harris’ problem was that, whereas the first group constituted 24 percent of the electorate in 2024, the size of the disaffected group was nearly double (46 percent).[5]

Not only was Harris handicapped by her close ties to an unpopular president and his record, she failed to persuade voters that she would chart a new course. One reason is that, as Biden’s vice president, she could hardly disavow responsibility for his policies. Moreover, she never made clear how she differed from Biden (save that she was younger, more energetic, and in better cognitive and physical health). This point was highlighted by a gaffe that some analysts claim was a turning point in the campaign. When an interviewer asked what, as president, she would have done differently than Biden, Harris replied, “There is not a thing that comes to mind….” Despite her many subsequent claims that she would be her own president, the damage was done—and the GOP endlessly broadcast her remark on social media and political ads. More generally, in an election when voters clamored for change, she never persuaded voters how and what she would change. By contrast, her opponent, not saddled by incumbency, presented himself as an outsider, a savage critic of the “deep state” and the educated elite, and a ferocious advocate for upending existing public policies, norms, and institutions.

An additional obstacle for Harris was Biden’s late withdrawal as candidate. Trump announced his candidacy in 2022 and had ample time to organize his campaign and conduct political rallies. He was also universally known, thanks to having starred in “The Apprentice,” a popular TV show, followed by serving as president. Although Harris was vice president, a majority of voters knew little about her until she became a candidate only 107 days before the election. And many received a wildly inaccurate description of her from biased cable news and social media.

Harris proved to be a very capable candidate. In the only televised debate of the campaign, watched by over 67 million Americans, she presented a striking contrast to Trump. (After his lamentable performance, Trump reneged on his agreement to participate in a second debate.) Immediately after Biden withdrew, and Harris became the Democratic candidate, she attracted a surge of new voter registrations and an unprecedented amount of small and large political donations. She drew overflow crowds at campaign rallies and her well-organized campaign seemed far superior to Trump’s chaotic performance and speeches rife with coarse insults about Harris and other women, toxic masculinity, and racist and xenophobic diatribes.

What was the impact of the two candidates’ dramatically different personalities and demeanor? Trump ominously described the United States in darkly apocalyptic terms. He falsely alleged that under Biden there had been a surge in violent crime (in fact, it diminished). He warned that immigrants were vermin poisoning the blood of America. He falsely claimed that under Biden’s presidency, surgeons were authorized to perform sex transformations on children without parental consent. He used words in his campaign speeches that cannot be repeated on radio and television, and that parents prohibit their children using. By contrast, Harris exuded grace, warmth, optimism, and good humor. She proclaimed that, while Trump was preparing a list of enemies to prosecute, she was preparing a to-do list of problems to solve. While Trump never smiled, Harris giggled and danced. Does Trump’s victory mean that fear trumps optimism? Apparently, given the sour mood of the country in 2024, it did in this election.

How much did the fact that Harris is a woman of color contribute to her defeat? Because survey respondents are reluctant to reveal racist and misogynist values, it is difficult to quantify how much her identity reduced her support. According to exit polls in the 2020 and 2024 elections, the racial and gender divides in partisan preferences were almost identical in the two elections even though both candidates in 2020 were White. [6] While this might suggest that the racial and gender gaps between Democratic and Republican candidates remained constant from 2020 to 2024, it is also plausible that antipathy to Harris, partly due to her personal identity, contributed to disproportionately greater abstentions. Whereas the popular vote for Donald Trump increased in 2024 compared to 2020, the popular vote for Kamala Harris significantly declined.

How much did the candidates’ positions on issues influence the result? As discussed, Harris shared Biden’s discredit for incumbency, policies, and post-pandemic state of the economy. At a more basic level, working people blamed Harris for the harm they suffered from the Democratic Party’s decades-old neoliberal approach and support for free-market globalization. (What a contrast with Trump’s isolationism and proposed imposition of steep tariffs.) While Harris proposed several progressive reforms, such as a $25,000 mortgage credit for first-time homeowners and childcare assistance, she refrained from adopting Bernie Sanders’ progressive agenda, including substantial federal construction of public housing, mandated reduction in the work week without pay cuts, and universal public medical care. While she supported doubling the abysmally low minimum wage, she announced the proposal in the last weeks of the campaign. Although Trump’s proposal to raise tariffs will be a regressive tax that will substantially raise prices and harm all Americans, especially those in the working class, it was not perceived as such by most Americans. While his signature plan to deport millions of immigrants is inhumane and will cause great economic harm, including a scarcity of goods and services and therefore higher prices, it was apparently popular among those seeking an explanation for the unpopular status quo.

Many young voters and people of color may have abstained or voted for Trump because of what they considered the Democratic administration’s one-sided support for Israel. (Never mind that Trump’s position was even more extreme.) The social movement opposing the Biden administration’s Middle East policy is the largest in the U.S. since Black Lives Matter. Further, there is extensive continuity between the leaders of and participants in the two movements. Biden’s refusal to condemn Israel’s bombardment of Gaza and his continued supply of lethal weapons, along with Harris’ decision to prevent a representative of Uncommitted, a pro-Palestine organization, from speaking at the Democratic National Convention, probably proved costly, especially in swing states.[7]

A quite different cultural theme (with an opposite valence) that was repeatedly highlighted by the GOP, and that resonated for many Americans, especially culturally conservatives, was the supposed harm caused by transgender women’s participation in women’s sports competition and access to women’s restrooms.

While the NBC 2024 exit poll found that voters considered the threat to democracy among the most important issues in the election, a significant minority concerned about this issue supported Trump. Presumably, Trump’s authoritarian tendencies mattered less for this group than lies about the Democrats’ alleged electoral corruption and his attempt to steal the 2020 election. (A majority of Republican voters continue to believe that the election was stolen.)

Trump’s victory resulted from the complex interaction among these and other factors. [8]  While Harris’ defense of reproductive rights was popular, the issue apparently generated less support than expected and less than it had for Democratic candidates in the 2022 mid-term congressional elections. This may have been because those elections occurred shortly after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade’s guarantee of reproductive rig[8] Most analysts portray the 2024 election as a landslide. The evidence for this claim is that, in contrast to every Republican presidential candidate in the last three decades, save for George W. Bush in 2004, Trump won a majority of the popular vote. He also won a decisive majority of the Electoral College. Further, support for the GOP increased in virtually every state and among every demographic group. Yet despite this unambiguous evidence of a red tide in 2024, I suggest that the extent of Trump’s victory margin and his increased support do not warrant calling his victory a landslide.

Regarding the outcome of the election, Trump barely won a popular majority. Further, if fewer than one percent of voters in all three “blue wall” states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin had voted for Harris instead of Trump, she would have been elected president! (She lost the three by less than 2%.) [9]  Moreover, while the proportion of votes that received Trump’s was greater in 2024 than in 2020, he received fewer votes this year. He won because the decline in votes cast for him from 2016 was less than the decline in the votes for Harris than Biden in 2020.

My claim that Trump won narrowly may appear to contradict my earlier assertion that Trump’s victory was probable. The contradiction can be resolved by recognizing that Trump was a weak candidate. Given voters’ widespread dissatisfaction with the Biden administration, and other factors described earlier, a GOP presidential candidate should have won in November by a much larger margin. One such indication is that a significant number of voters stated in exit polls that, while they voted for Trump, they did not like him. Another is that many Republican candidates for Congress and governorships outperformed Trump on November 5th. It might thus be that Trump won despite, not because of, his personal characteristics. This possibility is also consistent with the earlier observation that, although the stakes were very high this year, turnout was lower than in 2020. According to this interpretation, the reason may that neither candidate was especially popular this year.

The significance of the election

Now that the people have spoken, it matters to interpret what they have said. If Trump’s victory is understood as having been close, it suggests that his mandate is modest, reflecting the highly polarized nature of the country and his radical and quite unpopular agenda. (Public opinion polls find that, although Americans want a change, they oppose many of the specific reforms that Trump has proposed.)

Judging from Trump’s post-election bombastic pronouncements and the character of his nominations to positions in his future administration, he himself interprets his victory in the most expansive way. He apparently considers himself empowered to make fundamental changes in American political institutions, policies, and culture. An important indication is that less than two weeks after the election, most of those he has chosen for key executive positions are ideologically extreme, morally flawed, ignorant about the work of the agencies that they will direct, and inexperienced in managing vast and complex departments.

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Trump’s choice for secretary of defense has had a career as host of a program on one of Trump’s favorite cable networks. He lacks managerial experience and knowledge of military affairs. He has admitted making a large payment to buy the silence of a woman who claims that he her. Trump’s choice for director of public health services has no medical training and is a conspiracy theorist, regards vaccines as poisonous, and opposes fluoridating the nation’s water supply. Trump’s nominee for attorney general is probably his most bizarre choice. Matt Gaetz was a far-right member of Congress known for brash outbursts and attacks on his Republican colleagues. He was investigated by public prosecutors for bribery and sex trafficking of a minor. He resigned from Congress days before the House Ethics Committee issued a report detailing his misbehavior.[10]

All nominees have professed total loyalty to the president-elect; most are on the far right of the political spectrum and are fierce critics of the departments they have been appointed to direct.[11] Trump doubtless chose these sycophants to ensure that they will pursue his extremist authoritarian agenda. (This contrasts with his first term, when several appointees refused to implement his dangerous initiatives.)

What are the far-reaching policy proposals of the future Trump administration? How likely are they to be implemented, given that many are wildly unrealistic, promise to be highly unpopular, even by Trump’s own supporters, and will likely engender intense conflicts within the government and civil society? A future article will analyze the agenda, the challenges that it will face, and its possible outcome.[12]

[1] For fine analyses of voting patterns and their significance, see Antoine de Tarlé, “Trump, un succès sans précédent,” Telos, November 7, 2024, and Gérard Grunberg, “Etats-Unis: La fin du libéralism politique?”, Telos, November 19, 2024. 

[2] For a parallel claim, see Frank Bruni, “Democrats, Let’s Get Real About Why Harris Lost,” Opinion, Newsletter, New York Times, November 7, 2024; Shane Goldmacher et al, “How Trump Won, Why Harris Lost,” New York Times, November 7, 2024.

[3] Stanley B. Greenberg, “Donald Trump Was the Champion of Working-Class Discontent,” The American Prospect, November 19, 2024.

[4] Corina Knoll et al, “Behind the Anger May Be Something Else: Lingering Covid Grief,” New York Times November 6, 2024.

[5] nbcnews.com/politics/2024-elections/exit-polls. All exit poll statistics reported here are based on the swing states.

[6] The 2024 poll was cited above; the 2020 poll can be accessed at nbcnews.com/politics/2020-elections/exit-polls/.

[7]Peter Beinart, “Democrats Ignored Gaza and Brought Down Their Party,” New York Times, November 7, 2024. Nor was this position confined to youth and/or to Muslims. In the 2024 exit NBC poll, about double the numbers of Americans judged the Biden’s support for Israel as too great than judged that it was  too weak.

[8] Examples include the campaign strategies of the two candidates and the role of the media.

[9] She also lost two other large swing states, North Carolina and Georgia, by less than 3%.

[10] By resigning from Congress, Gaetz sought to prevent publication of the report. John Bolton, a former Trump cabinet member described him as “the most unqualified nominee for a cabinet position in American history.”

[11] Michelle Goldberg, “If You Thought Trump Wasn’t Serious, Look at His First Appointments,” New York Times, November 12, 2024; and Peter Baker, “Trump Swings Wrecking Ball at Status Quo,” New York Times, November 18, 2024. Given the extraordinary mediocrity and flaws of most nominees, it is likely that several will be forced to withdraw before they take office.

[12]I speculated about this issue in “Le Crépuscule de la démocratie américaine,” Telos, Jan. 29, 2024.