Iraq, the Symptom; Democracy, the Problem edit

The Iraq (mis)adventure was only the proximate cause of the defeat of the republican party in the November 7^th elections. Although mid-term elections usually depend on local conditions, the democrats managed to nationalize a sufficient number of political contests to carry the day. They were helped in this by George W. Bush's decision to make use again of the weapon that had worked so well in 2002 and 2004: the «war on terror,» which was rapidly conflated with the war in Iraq. But the election brought victory to the democrats only by default; the president's emphasis on Iraq focalized attention more broadly on the system of government that the republicans have imposed over the past six years.

-->Why, it should be asked, was the electorate was not fooled this time by the president's vision of a world where our enemies are everywhere and the safety depends on a determined will? He had crystallized the diffuse anxiety that followed the terror of September 11^th 2001 into a politics of fear that anathematized «liberals» and «elites» who recognized the trap set by the practice of a-symmetric warfare: an over-reaction that sacrifices constitutional rights and civil freedoms to a politics that knows only friend or foe. Commentators have argued that the rhetorical trick failed this time because the reality of the Iraqi quagmire could no longer be ignored. While not false, the claim treats only the symptom of a broader problem.

The event that catalyzed the shift in opinion took place in 2005, at the end of the August vacation: hurricane Kathrina, and its aftermath. One heard the word «refugee» applied to Americans; one saw the hard racial and economic divide that apparent prosperity (and tax cuts for the wealthy) had masked; and one learned that the government that was supposed to care for its citizens was populated by political cronies linked to corrupt lobbyists. From here, it was a short step for the public to recognize the same incompetence and corruption behind the failed Iraq invasion, from the administration of the immediate post-war situation to the profiteering-at-the-expense of reconstruction by companies such as Halliburton. The republicans' aura was tainted; but the republicans in control of Congress blocked investigations or reforms. In this context, the albatross of a long and futile war brought them down.

Iraq was a symptom of a deeper malaise. The often repeated project of Karl Rove (the man called «Bush's brain») was to create a republican majority that would last for a generation. To that end, his party did not hesitate to use its power, in judicial nominations, in staffing the regulatory agencies, and in the granting legislative favors to a variety of allies united only by the largesse being distributed. Despite conservative rhetoric favoring small government and fiscal prudence, the budgetary consequences were ignored. The centralization of power was justified by the theory of the «unitary executive» that gave the president the power append to legislation «signing statements» explaining how he would interpret the will of Congress).

In this context, the influence of Iraq on the electoral results should be seen as a catharsis, the moment of truth. It symbolized the rejection of a system of government that recognized no limits. It was an implicit reassertion of the principles of democracy. But it was not a victory for the democratic party, who now have legislative power but no program.

There is a virtue in the democrats' ideological deficit: as opposed to the republicans who seized control of Congress in 1994 by promising a «Contract with America,» the democrats will be cautious. The victory of Joe Lieberman (running as an independent, after being defeated in the primaries by an anti-war candidate) warns them against a radical course in Iraq. Republican domination had denied them one of the fundamental tools of American-style democracy: the power of investigation. Proper use this instrument demands political judgement. Congressional commissions of inquiry cannot be treated as judicial bodies that meet out punishment to guilty parties. Their task is to restore the oversight that is necessary to the workings of a government based on an intricate structure of checks and balances.

George Bush has tried to camouflage his defeat by claiming that it signified only the desire for the kind of bi-partisan cooperation that he had practiced as governor of Texas. But democrats there are far more conservative than the national party; and the office of governor is far weaker than the presidency of the United States. The defeat of many moderate republicans by equally moderate democrats will move their party to the right, opening space in the center for Congressional initiative. Some popular domestic reforms will be legislated-raising of the minimum wage, competitive pricing for pharmaceutical products, and perhaps immigration reform. The massive tax cuts of the past will expire, fiscal policy will be re-oriented and attention paid to the deficit. Major initiatives will be held in abeyance because of the horizon of the 2008 presidential contest.

One should not, however, wax irenic. George W. Bush has not given up the fight. He has proposed that the old, republican-dominated Congress which is in office until January, pass a law that legitimates the secret domestic wiretapping of suspected terrorists; and he has asked it to confirm the nomination of the neo-conservative John Bolton as U.N. ambassador. This poses the question whether there is a possibility of bi-partisan cooperation on Iraq? (The task is made even more difficult by the disagreements within the democratic party itself.) The hope of many is that the report of the unofficial commission of investigation co-directed by James Baker, the former Secretary of State to Bush père who has been pointedly ignored by the fils) will reject the autistic idealism of the neo-conservatives. But while a return to realpolitik would be welcome, it would abandon the politics of human rights that, since the democratic administrations of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, has at least been honored verbally. Will the democrats' caution on the domestic front lead them to renounce their best principles?

It's too early for any but the most general predictions. But insofar as the neo-imperial politics of the Bush government has been a mirror image of its push to exert complete control over the political life of the nation, the results of the November elections suggest a longer-term perspective for the democrats. Cautious legislative proposals joined with vigorous oversight that renews the dynamic created by the separation of powers presuppose a recognition on the part of the new majority that the volontarism of the neo-conservatives must be replaced by a politics of judgement that recognizes the existence of limits. This does not mean giving up on wider goals; it is the precondition for defining valid principles of action. Limits (as Hegel wisely pointed out) are not imposed by harsh reality on the pure will to action; paradoxically, they are recognized as such only when they have been surpassed in thought. This dialectic of goals and limits will be present as the democrats are forced to go beyond the refusal of Bush's Iraq debacle to elaborate their own foreign policy. A new realism that recognizes the limits of American power can be justified only from the standpoint of principles that go beyond it. As in domestic politics, compromise becomes legitimate only when based on a goal that goes beyond it and drives it forward.

Pragmatic Americans are notoriously allergic to generalizations; practice precedes theory, which is how the elections were won. When he was re-elected in 2004, George Bush famously said «I've earned some capital and I'm going to spend it.» In fact, he wasted it by over-reaching, at home and abroad. The political reality of divided government will constrain the new majority, which will have to learn in practice the dialectic of ideals and limits. As it does so, it will come to understand how it can invest its «capital» step by step in order to become a political party worthy of the ideal that its name proudly proclaims. It may fail to reach this ideal, remaining simply a pragmatic coalition within a constitutional structure that can be called democratic only because it prevents the creation of the kind of absolute power sought by Bush's republicans. Even that, it has to be admitted, would be a worthy result of the victory of November 7^th.